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challenge
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possibility
"causal basis," and "bare disposition."
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the claim that the concept of a disposition
entails that dispositions
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due to Prior, Pargetter,
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It is asked what

the cause

and reason are of opium's making one sleep.
is in it a dormitive
virtue whose

I respond: because
there
nature it is to put the senses to sleep.
"Le Malade
Moliere,
Imaginaire"
To which

1.

Introduction

jest illustrates, if someone is wondering why taking opium
one
to
to do so is not very
puts
sleep, telling him that it has a disposition
helpful. More ought to be said about why opium causes sleep, and in fact, we
can say more: opium contains alkaloids such as morphine which, being struc
turally similar to the body's naturally occurring peptides, bind to opiate

As Moliere's

receptors in the brain, causing sleep. Some people think that all dispositions
are like the dormitivity of opium, in that there must always be another prop
of the disposition. When people
erty that causally explains the manifestation
ask why something produces a certain effect, they are often looking for a
deeper explanation than just "because it is disposed to produce that effect."
The inability to produce a deeper explanation, on this view, reflects ignorance
or a failure of understanding.1 It is supposed that there must be something
or to use
other than the disposition
that causally explains the manifestation,
1

to Moliere's
thus expose ourselves
ridicule,
and, if we did nothing further, we
it." D. M. Armstrong,
deserve
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
(London: Cambridge
Press, 1973), 15.
University
"We

would
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that is now common, every disposition must have a distinct
terminology
"causal basis." There is something puzzling about the idea of a bare disposi
that has no distinct causal basis. Some have argued that
tion?a disposition
I disagree. Bare
is incoherent. However,
the very idea of a bare disposition
are possible. Moreover,
it is an open question whether any
dispositions
in
bare
this
world.
have
objects
dispositions
bare dispositions
programs,
figure in larger metaphysical
Significantly,
view that matter is the "permanent possibil
for example, the phenomenalist
ity of sensation."2 More recently, some philosophers have defended the view
properties of the ultimate constituents of matter are dis
On
these views, the world abounds with bare dispositions.

that the fundamental
positional.3

On

some

views,

other

Lewis'

there

are

no

bare

For

dispositions.

example,

to

according

that is true about

"Humean

the world

supervenience," everything
supervenes on "a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact."4 I take it
that, on this view, these local matters of particular fact are not dispositional.
Humean superven
It follows that, if the world contains bare dispositions,
ience is false. Clearly,

a defense of bare dispositions

has broad philosophical

significance.

My defense will proceed as follows. In part 1,1 explain more fully what I
mean by "disposition,"
"causal basis," and "bare disposition."
In part 2, I
consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions
are

not

bare.

In part

3,1

consider

arguments,

due

to Prior,

Pargetter,

and

Jack

son, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases.5 In part 4, I con
sider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions
because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals.6 In the
end, I find no reason to deny the possibility

of bare dispositions.

versus Categorical

1.1 Dispositional

The paradigm examples of dispositions, as I am using the term, are properties
solu
of physical objects: fragility, inflammability,
elasticity, conductivity,
and
for
These
proper
bility, volatility, dormitivity,
poisonousness,
example.

John Stuart Mill,
William
3

Collected

Works

Hamilton's

his Writings,
For example,

Philosophy
ed. J.M. Robson

Volume IX: An Examination
of John Stuart Mill,
of Sir
in
and of The Principal Philosophical
Discussed
Questions
Toronto
183.
of
Press, 1979),
(Toronto: University

Simon Blackburn,
50 (1990), 60-65; P. F. Straw
"Filling in Space," Analysis
son, "Reply to Evans" in Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical
(Oxford: Claren
Subjects
All the Way Around,"
don Press, 1980), 273-282; Richard Holton, "Dispositions
Analysis
9-14.
59(1999),

David

Lewis,

Philosophical

Papers,

vol.

II (New

York:

Oxford

University

Press,

1986),

ix.
5

W. Prior, Robert Pargetter, and Frank Jackson, "Three
19 (1982), 251-257.
tions," American Philosophical
Quarterly,
Smith and Daniel
Michael
Stoljar, "Global Response
Dependence
Elizabeth

ism," Monist,
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Theses

About

and Noumenal

Disposi
Real

ties are associated with an event-type involving the object that has the dispo
of the disposition?shattering,
is the manifestation
event-type

sition. This

evaporating, putting to sleep,
stretching, conducting, dissolving,
can
a
so
on.
An
have
and
object
disposition prior to the occurrence
poisoning
an
even if the
can
have a disposition
In fact,
of the manifestation.
object
never occurs. A glass can remain fragile
manifestation
of that disposition
burning,

even if it never shatters, fuel can be inflammable even if it never burns, and
a disposition
so on. In addition to its manifestation,
is associated with
another

event-type,

the

circumstances

In

of manifestation.

typically involve
ity, the circumstances of manifestation
case
In
of
the circumstances
the
solubility,
fragile object.
involve the submersion of the soluble object in a solvent.

the

case

of

fragil

a striking of the
of manifestation

An attribution of a disposition to an object licenses inferences about what
will happen in various circumstances. According to Elizabeth Prior, "What is
is that there exists
commonly accepted by all those who discuss dispositions
to an
a conceptual connection between a statement attributing a disposition
statements entail
item and a particular conditional."7 To say that disposition
if you
counterfactual s is perhaps too strong,8 but we can admit this much:
a
certain disposition,
know that something has
and that it will be subject to
the circumstances of manifestation,
you have some basis for predicting its
behavior. For example, if you know that a sugar cube is water-soluble,
that it is about to be placed in a beaker of water at room temperature,
have good grounds for predicting that itwill dissolve.
A categorical property, by contrast, need not be associated with
ing

a manifestation.9

or

event

As

paradigm

examples

of

and
you

a trigger

categorical

proper

ties, philosophers often offer shape properties. To say something is square is
not to say anything about what it would do in particular circumstances;
squareness has no associated manifestation or triggering event.10 According to
7
8

Elizabeth Prior, Dispositions
Press, 1985), 5.
(New Jersey: Aberdeen University
C. B. Martin,
and Conditionals"
(American Philosophical
1994)
"Dispositions
Quarterly,
statements do not entail certain simple counterfactu
among others, show that disposition
if a fragile
als. For example,
is true, but the counterfactual

10

is fragile"
glass is protected by internal supports, "the glass
"If the glass were struck itwould break" is false.
that this distinction
need not suppose
is
among
properties

For present
purposes, we
For example, mathematical
exhaustive.
properties and some
nor dispositional.
ile or square) might be neither categorical

disjunctive

properties

(frag

For example, he says that
argues that even shape properties are dispositions.
to be counted as three-angled
is the property of being disposed
triangularity
("In Defense
of Dispositions,"
83 (1974),
Review,
171). Similarly, Goodman
Philosophical
says "a
cubical object is one capable of fitting try squares and measuring
in certain
instruments

Hugh Mellor

a lasting objec
Indeed, almost every predicate commonly
ways.
thought of as describing
as
tive characteristic
of a thing is as much a dispositional
other"
any
(Fact,
predicate
4th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Fiction, and Forecast,
Press, 1983), 41). I
am not going to discuss
I am just trying to explain
these claims here;
the distinction
between
any)

and categorical
taking a stand as to which
(if
properties, without
fall
I
into
each
category. Nothing
say hangs on the correct way
properties

dispositional

specific
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a common

view,

categorical

properties

lack

the

special

to

relation

counterfac

Prior says, "dispositional properties can be distin
tuals had by dispositions.
sentences
ascription
guished from categorical ones because dispositional
a relationship

to certain subjunctive conditionals not possessed by
sentences."11
Along these lines, Stephen Yablo offers
categorical ascription
as an intuitive characterization,
"a property is categorical just in case a
thing's having it is independent of what goes on in nonactual worlds."12

possess

to
I'm assuming
that the dispositional/categorical
distinction
applies
some
claim.
this
and
but
Shoe
Armstrong
philosophers dispute
properties,
maker, for example, both say that the distinction applies merely to predicates.
says that what determines the identity of a property "is its poten
tial for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it."13 One
might want to describe his view by saying that all properties are disposi
tional, but Shoemaker resists this move. He says "I think that the term
Shoemaker

is best employed as a predicate of predicates, not of proper
'dispositional'
claims
that the dispositional/categorical
ties."14 Similarly,
Armstrong
a
distinction
is
"verbal distinction
that cuts no ontological
ice."15 Unlike
thinks that all properties are categorical.16
Shoemaker, however, Armstrong
He acknowledges
that some states of objects are picked out by disposition
terms, but claims that such terms simply provide us with a useful way of
speaking of categorical

properties.
thinks that the distinction
between properties
is
Clearly, Armstrong
one
so
a
non
thinks
of
the
is
if
coherent?he
that
and
empty,
just
categories
then it must

to predicates. And although
as a predicate of predicates,
Shoemaker wants to reserve 'being dispositional'
that the distinction between properties makes
he can agree with Armstrong
sense?he
just disagrees about which category is empty. These views differ
trivial distinction

is wanted,

apply

from the extreme thesis that the distinction between dispositional
properties
and categorical properties is unintelligible, or that a purely linguistic distinc
tion is being confused with a distinction between entities. For example, some
while others such as 'red'
property terms such as 'yellow' are polysyllabic,
to conclude that, because of this
It would be a mistake
an
there
is
distinction between the
fact,
interesting metaphysical
linguistic
terms
to
is
which
these
refer.
There
widespread agreement, at least,
properties
are monosyllabic.

to characterize
there being
12

Dispositions,

categorical
no categorical
62.

properties,

for my

arguments

here would

be consistent

and Indiscernibility,"
The Journal
84:6
Yablo, "Identity, Essence,
of Philosophy
is inadequate.
1987), 306. Yablo goes on to argue that this characterization
and Properties,"
in Peter van Inwagen,
ed., Time and
Sydney Shoemaker,
"Causality
to Richard Taylor (Dordrecht: Reidel,
Cause: Essays Presented
1980), 109-136.
Stephen

13
14
16
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with

properties.

(June

Ibid.,2\\.
Belief, Truth and Knowledge,
Tim Crane, ed., Dispositions:
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15.
A Debate

(New York: Routledge,

1996),

16.

that the dispositional/categorical
my

arguments

on

proceed

not merely

the

distinction
assumption

is not
that

the

like that. Consequently,
issues

are

metaphysical,

linguistic.17

1.2 Causal

Bases

a sleeping pill puts someone to sleep, that event can be causally
explained in terms of the chemical properties of the pill. When a fragile glass
breaks, that event can be causally explained in terms of the microstructural

When

of the glass. These chemical and microstructural
properties are
to
A
the associated manifestations.18
causally relevant
property of a disposed
of the disposition
is
object which can causally explain the manifestation

properties

called a causal basis of that disposition. A causal basis is a property of an
of the disposition.
object which is causally relevant to the manifestation
a
So, a causal basis is causally relevant property, but what kind of prop
erty? There are three candidates. Either causal bases are always categorical,
or they can be either categorical or dispositional.19 A
always dispositional,
causal basis for fragility might be a particular type of molecular bonding.
Plausibly, to have a particular type of molecular bonding is to have a disposi
tional property. As Armstrong says, "To talk of molecular bonding is surely
to talk again in terms of dispositions
of bonded things."20 If a type of
as
the basis of fragility, say, then there can be
molecular bonding can serve
causal bases of dispositions
that are themselves dispositions.
I use the
"causal basis" as neutral between dispositional

expression
cal

bases,

unless

stated

bases and categori

otherwise.

that a causal basis is not, conceptually or by definition, distinct from
if fragility turns out to be causally relevant to
its associated disposition:
own causal basis. This will become important
then
is
its
breaking,
fragility
Note

in the arguments
Similarly,
applies

only

distinguish

that follow.

18

rele

which do imply a distinct causal basis. However,
the
predicates,
the bare/non-bare
distinction
in our language does not look promis

all parties to the debate under consideration
treat the bare/non-bare
ing. Furthermore,
so Iwill set this possibility
distinction as metaphysical,
aside.
What
is it for a property to be causally relevant? Intuitively,
some properties
exemplified
in an event are relevant to what that event causes, and others are not. If a baseball
is
at a window,
the mass and velocity
the color of the ball seems
breaking, while
thrown

relevant
to..." and "...causally
explains..."
between
"causal
paper, I do not distinguish
Jackson does ("Mental Properties, Essentialism
totelian Society, 95, 253-268).

20

balk at the idea of a causally

itmight be said that the distinction
bare and non-bare
between
dispositions
to predicates. One may claim that among the dispositional
predicates, we can
the bare-dispositional
predicates, which
imply no distinct causal basis, and the

non-bare-dispositional
of locating

prospect

One might

of the ball seem

to the window's
relevant
"
I use expressions
...is causally
For the purposes
of this
interchangeably.
as Frank
relevance"
and "causal efficacy,"
irrelevant.

and Causation,"

Proceedings

I am not assuming
the dispositional/categorical
to be
distinction
Although
these are the three salient
given the classes of properties under consideration,
13.
Belief Truth and Knowledge,
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vant disposition;
can have
however, anyone who claims that dispositions
can
causal
bases
is
that
be
dispositional
dispositions
supposing
causally rele
a
a
can
vant. If disposition
be the causal basis of
disposition, what is to pre
from being a causal basis of itself?
seem counter-intuitive
to say that a disposition can be its own
I think this sense of counter-intuitiveness
causal basis. However,
results from

clude a disposition
It might

that can be dispelled by getting clear on how these expressions are
To
say that a disposition can be its own causal basis is not to say
employed.
that a disposition causally explains itself, but only that it causally explains
confusions

its manifestation.

Furthermore,

when

one

says

"a

has

disposition

a

causal

and the causal
basis," this does not, by itself, suggest that the disposition
basis are distinct. A disposition and a causal basis are both properties instan
tiated by objects. It is the object with the disposition
that has the causal
sense. To say that a disposition
has a
basis, in the property-instantiation
causal basis is not to say that one property instantiates another; rather, it is
to say that an object with that disposition
instantiates a property which is
relevant

to the manifestation

of that disposition.
that a
Showing
disposition has a causal basis does not by itself show that it has a distinct
causal basis. If one object instantiates a dispositional
property and a causally
relevant property, for all that has been said, they might be one and the same
causally

property.

If some disposition
is relevant to its manifestation,
this by itself does not
rule out some categorical property of the object also being relevant to the
manifestation.

We

need

not

assume

that

a

thing

can

only

have

one

causal

basis per disposition; perhaps many of an object's properties are relevant to
the manifestation
of the disposition. Therefore, a disposition could be its own
causal basis, and have a distinct causal basis as well.
1.3 Bare Dispositions
and causal bases, we are
Equipped with this understanding of dispositions
now better placed to understand the concept of a bare disposition. A bare dis
is a disposition
that has no distinct causal basis, neither disposi
position
tional nor categorical. A disposition whose unique causal basis is itself would
count as a bare disposition. If an object has a bare disposition,
the object has
no intrinsic properties which are both distinct from the disposition and caus
ally relevant to its manifestation. One might say it is just a brute fact about
the thing that it is so disposed. For example, suppose a glass were "barely
fragile," and it shattered. The only properties of the glass which could be
causally

relevant to the shattering are properties which

are not distinct

from

fragility.
In saying that a bare disposition has no distinct causal basis, by 'distinct'
I cannot mean merely non-identical?for
then finding multiple
causal bases
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from the disposition would be too easy, and my thesis would be
trivially false. If being fragile is causally relevant to breaking, perhaps being
a fragile glass is as well. If we treat being fragile as distinct from being a
simply
fragile glass, the glass's fragility could not be a bare disposition,
because being a fragile glass would count as a distinct causal basis. So we
distinct

to understand

need

as

'distinctness'

something

other

than

Intui

non-identity.

tively, we need a notion of two properties being separable or independent. I
if "x has property F" entails "x has prop
offer as a preliminary suggestion,
erty G," it follows that F and G are not distinct. So, being a fragile glass is
not distinct from being fragile.
I want to clar
Before considering the arguments against bare dispositions,
ify what I take bare dispositions to be by way of comparison to other views.
is not bare simply by show
I think that one cannot show that a disposition
of the dispo
ing that some property is causally relevant to the manifestation
to the mani
is
relevant
itself
sition. It may be that the disposition
causally
If a disposition has no causal basis except for itself, it seems right
to say that the disposition is bare. Hence, I define a bare disposition as a dis
position that has no distinct causal basis.
festation.

Taking the above points into consideration, I think that my account fares
better than competing accounts. Mark Johnston offers the following alterna
"x would R
If x has a bare disposition,
tive definition of a bare disposition:
x
cause of
or
no
is
the
of anything else
intrinsic feature of
in S under C and
x's R-ing in S."211 take Johnston to be saying that, if x has a bare disposi
in the circumstances of manifesta
tion, x would exhibit the manifestation
no
is
feature
intrinsic
of
tion, but
causally relevant to the manifesta
anything
tion. It seems as though Johnston is committed to the view that if a barely
fragile
for

glass

instance,

was
is

shattered
causally

by

no

a hammer,

relevant

to

the

intrinsic

shattering.

property
More

of
to

the
the

hammer,
point,

on

account, if bare fragility were an intrinsic property of the glass, it
could not be causally relevant to the shattering. Johnston's definition signifi
that are both
cantly differs from mine in that it rules out bare dispositions
intrinsic and causally relevant to their manifestations.
Johnston's

in mind, we can now consider the
my account of bare dispositions
question: are such things possible? In the rest of this paper, I will defend the
are possible
claim that they are. One way of showing that bare dispositions
With

be to produce an example. While fragility does not look like a good
of funda
candidate for a bare disposition, perhaps some of the dispositions
mental particles are. Consider the property of being negatively charged, and
would

the dispositions of negatively charged things, such as being disposed to repel
other negatively charged things. Is there a possible world in which particles
are negatively charged, but not thereby disposed to repel other negatively
21

Mark

Johnston,

"How

to Speak of the Colors,"
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Philosophical

Studies

68 (1992):

234.
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If not,

charged particles?
and

charged

then the connection

in certain

behaving

in certain

ways

between

being

negatively

is not

circumstances

acciden

suggests that negative charge is itself a dispositional
to repel negatively
not
is
distinct from the disposition
property (which
seems
it
that
there
is no structural,
probable
charged particles). Furthermore,
to
property of an electron which accounts for its dispositions
micro-physical
tal or contingent.

This

any rate, current physics does not tell us
repel and attract other particles?at
are more than some remote
otherwise. If this is right, then bare dispositions
metaphysical
possibility. Our best scientific theories posit properties which
are bare dispositions. As Strawson points out:
It seems

that our search
theoretical

undeniably

the properties
which

of

dispositional

the categorical

physics

force, mass,

matter?perhaps
thoroughly

for

properties

impenetrability,
22
in character...

assigns

electric

charge.

lead us to the
finally
ultimate
constituents
of

base must
to

the

But

these properties

seem

to be

the stronger claim that "science finds only dispositional
the
all
way down."23 These considerations give us reason to think
properties,
that bare dispositions aren't merely possible, but are instantiated by the ulti

Blackburn

mate

makes

of our

constituents

actual

2. The

world.

Conceptual

Argument

say that the very concept of a disposition
precludes bare disposi
it is part of the concept of a disposition
that it has a distinct
tions?that
causal basis.24 For example, a disposition can be said to be:

Some

a higher order property of having some distinct intrinsic properties
which would cause the manifestation
of the disposition
in the cir
cumstances

of manifestation.25

are ruled out a priori;
is correct, bare dispositions
truth that all dispositions have distinct causal bases.

it is an

If this definition
analytic

the causal relations of an object seem far more
However,
sition ascriptions than its intrinsic properties. Consider what
we felt justified in making a certain disposition claim but
distinct causal basis for that disposition. Suppose an object
itsmanifestation

23

5
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say if
could not find a

x reliably exhib
we
can
no property dis
but
find
C,
that is causally relevant to the manifestation.
Per

M under circumstances

tinct from the disposition
22

central to dispo
we would

to Evans," 280.
"Filling in Space," 255.
Gareth Evans, "Things Without
the Mind,"
76-116;
Press),
(Oxford Clarendon
jects
"Reply

88-90.
Dependence..."
from Johnston,
Adapted
this analysis.
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"How

to Speak

in Zak
also
of

van Straaten,
Sub
ed., Philosophical
and Stoljar,
"Global
Response

Smith

the Colors,"

234.

Johnston

does

not endorse

haps we would assume that there has to be a distinct causal basis, but we just
that
haven't discovered it yet. But what would be our grounds for making
assumption? Suppose we were in a far superior epistemic situation; we have
a (nearly) exhaustive list of x's properties and their causal upshots. We are
trying to decide whether to add disposition D to the list of x's properties. We
find no other properties that are causally relevant toM, and yet whenever x is
in C, it exhibits M. What are we to say? If x will exhibit M whenever it is
in C, it seems natural to say that x is disposed to exhibit M in C, and that it
to exhibit M in C. It would do more injustice to our lin
has a disposition
than to say that it
guistic practices to deny that the thing has the disposition
does, inexplicable as that may be.
One might think that the situation I have described is impossible; how
ever, nothing in our language or our concepts tells us that. We can imagine
the discovery described above, so it is no part of the meaning of "dis
terms in general that there is a distinct causal
position" or of disposition
If
basis.
the conceptual analysis were correct, we would have to say that the
that we thought it did.
object in our example did not have the disposition

making

if the foes of bare dispositions were right to say this, though, I don't
see how they would have achieved any more than a verbal victory. There is a
substantive issue still left, concerning what types of properties objects can
shouldn't be called "disposi
have. If what I'm calling "bare dispositions"

Even

tions" strictly speaking,

they might

3. The
In "Three Theses

nevertheless

Thesis26

Non-Identity

about Dispositions,"

Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson defend:

(1) The Causal Thesis: All dispositions
(2) The Non-Identity Thesis:
attendant dispositions.

be possible.

Causal

have causal bases;27 and
bases

are not

identical

to their

theses are meant

to apply not only to actual dispositions,
but to all
It
has a
follows
that,
possible dispositions.
necessarily, every disposition
causal basis which is not identical to the disposition, and so bare dispositions

These

Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (hereafter jointly referred to as 'PPJ') call this thesis "The
it is clear that by 'distinct', they mean non-identical.
Distinctness
Thesis." However,
As I
am using the expression
can be non-identical
'distinct,' two properties
yet fail to be dis
tinct if one entails the other. To avoid confusion,
I translate PPJ's distinctness
talk into
talk.

non-identity
"causal

"the property
basis," PPJ mean
... the antecedent
circumstances,
together with
tion for the manifestation"
("Three Theses...,"

By

of the causal
ancies

between

discussion

or property
of the object
that,
complex
is the causally operative
sufficient
condi
251). This is along the lines of my account

basis as a property which
is causally relevant to the manifestation.
Discrep
if there are any, should make
these two accounts,
to the
little difference

that follows,

since

I grant the Causal
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to grant the Causal Thesis for the sake of
are impossible.28 I am willing
no
to
of bare dispositions.
The
threat
the possibility
This
is
argument.
is
that the property which
Causal Thesis still leaves open the possibility
is the disposition
of a disposition
causally relevant to the manifestation
itself Given that we have no reason to suppose a priori that the causal basis
PPJ need to establish the Non-Identity
is not identical to the disposition,
to show that there can be no bare dispositions.
PPJ offer three main arguments for the Non-Identity

Thesis

bases are not identical
multiple

readability,

Thesis

that causal

two arguments from
to their attendant dispositions:
and one based on what PPJ call "swamping" the causal

basis.

3.1 The Arguments from Multiple

Realizability

PPJ begin by noting that a disposition
ferent objects. They go on to say:
cannot

We

having

say both

that being fragile
structure ?; because

crystalline
that having molecular

conclusion

=

can have different causal bases

having molecular
by transitivity we

bonding

a = having

bonding
would

crystalline

in dif

and that being fragile =
led to the manifestly
false
29
structure p.
a,

be

PPJ are assuming that if one is going to identify a disposition with its causal
basis in one case, one must do so in all cases. They go on to reason that
since some dispositions can have several distinct causal bases, it is absurd to
identify the dispositions with each of these causal bases.
if one considers the possibility
of bare dispositions,
PPJ's
can
no
reason
one
to
think
be
There
is
is
if
that,
rejected.
going
assumption
to identify a disposition with its causal basis, one has to do so in all cases.
One could identify a disposition with some causal bases, but not others.
However,

like fragility could be bare in some instances, and
Suppose that a disposition
in other instances. In such a case, fragility
causal
bases
have
different
yet
would be identical to the first causal basis, but not the second. We do not
is ever identical to its causal basis, then it
have to say that if a disposition
that
has to be identical to all of its possible causal bases. PPJ show at most,
is not identical to its causal basis. However,
in some instances, a disposition
of a disposition
this does not preclude the possibility
being had barely in
other
2

instances.
follow
itwould
that there can be no dispositions
which
have no
precise,
nor any dispositions which
are identical to their causal bases. However,
leave open the possibility
that there can be dispositions
PPJ's arguments
which are neither
identical to, nor distinct from, their causal bases. (I have in mind two different
properties
are not distinct
one entails
in the sense I explained
which
the other.)
earlier, because
To be more
causal

These
ested

bases,

dispositions
in defending

would

PPJ's
29

seriously.
challenge
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on my view. However,
as bare dispositions
I am inter
can be their own causal bases, so I take
that dispositions

count

the claim

In their second argument, PPJ move from the existential claim that some
are not identical to their attendant dispositions
to the modal
claim that no causal basis can be identical to its attendant disposition. Con

causal bases

sidering a disposition
that:

that has only one causal basis

in this world, PPJ claim

if "fragility (being fragile) = having a (say)" is true, it is necessarily
so, and if false, necessar
one or the other doesn't
exist, if there are any). But there are
ily so (ignoring worlds where
objects do not have a, for it is contingent as to what the causal basis of a
=
there are worlds where
having a" is false for the decisive
"fragility
disposition
reason that the extensions
of fragility and being a differ in that world; and therefore by rigidity

worlds

where

fragile
is. Hence

it is false

in all worlds,

including

the actual world.

This argument can be set out as follows. Let D be a disposition,
a causal basis of D, leaving it open whether P is identical to D.
(1)

and let P be

that P is the causal basis of D.

It is contingent

(2) Therefore, there is a world inwhich
x has D and x does not have P.

there is an object x such that:

(3) Therefore, there is a world with respect to which
=
"having D
having P" is false.
(4)

If "having D = having P" is true, it is necessarily

(5) Therefore, D

true.

is not identical to P.

can grant (1). However,
The bare dispositionalist
(2) does not follow. What
follows from (1) is that there are worlds in which an object x has disposition
D, and P is not a causal basis of D. But that is consistent with x's having P.
(1) by itself gives us no reason to suppose that there is any world in which
some object has D but not P?unless
of course, we are supposing that P and
D are different properties, which would beg the question.
the argument as applied to a particular example. Suppose that
property. Further, suppose that
having negative charge is a dispositional
own
is
its
causal
basis.
negative charge
Conceding PPJ's points, if "negative
=
negative charge" is true, it is necessarily true, and it is contingent
charge
that the causal basis of negative charge is negative charge. Even if negative
Consider

charge is its own causal basis, it could have had a different causal basis; there
is a possible world in which objects are negatively charged, say, because of
some complex structural property. In that world, the structural property is the
of negative charge. So
only property which is relevant to the manifestation
there is a world
30

in which

negative

charge is not its own causal basis. How

Ibid., 254.
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ever, that is not a world
not

does

have

in which

some object has negative

charge.

negative

I think that the initial plausibility
guity of the contested claim:
"D = D's

basis"

on whether

Depending
contested

causal

charge, and yet

is necessarily

"D's

causal

of PPJ's

trades on the ambi

argument

true.

is taken

basis"

to refer rigidly,

the

can mean:

claim

(1) Necessarily,

D = property P (which happens

to be D's

causal basis).

Or it could mean:
(2) Necessarily,

D = any property which

fulfills

the role of being D's

basis.

causal

can accept (1) while denying (2), and it is only (2)
The bare dispositionalist
which is subject to the difficulties PPJ raise. I conclude that the arguments
do not show that a disposition cannot be its own
from multiple readability
basis.

causal

the Disposition

3.2 Swamping

third argument for the Non-Identity Thesis runs as follows. Even if
property P were the only causal basis of some disposition D, a particular
object x may have P, but x may have other properties that "swamp" P so that
x does not have D. In that case, x would have P without having D. Therefore,

PPJ's

P * D. As PPJ put it:
that even if there is only one causal basis of fragility,
say, bonding a, it
some objects
that have a are not fragile.
happen that although all fragile objects have a,
an internal structural property
the
S which
This would be the case if there were
swamped
there is the difficulty

may

effect

of having

a.

First of all, it is not clear why this is not just a case of masking.32 The fra
gility of a glass ismasked when the glass is equipped with internal supports
such that it
that prevent it from breaking. The causal basis is overwhelmed,
not produce breaking, even when the
case of masking,
intuitively, the glass still
not a case where you have the causal basis
to the claim that
is not a counterexample

will

Ibid., 253.
As
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the disposition

basis.

causal

31

in the
glass is struck. However,
remains fragile. Therefore, this is
but not the disposition,
and so it

discussed

in Johnston,
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"How

to Speak

of the Colors."

is identical to the

But perhaps PPJ take themselves to have described a situation in which an
fragility.
object has the base property a, but fails to have the disposition,
That would be to say, the property a is not a property of the object that,
together with the circumstances, would be a causally operative sufficient
condition for breaking. But that is to say that property a is not the causal
basis of fragility. PPJ define "causal basis" as the property of an object that,
together with the circumstances, would be the causally operative sufficient
of the disposition.33 So, if an object could
condition for the manifestation
have some property without having a given disposition,
then that property
cannot be the causal basis of that disposition. In the scenario described above,
the causal basis of fragility has just been misidentified.
As applied to a bare disposition, PPJ's suggestion amounts to the claim
x can have
that an object x can have a disposition D, but simultaneously
some other properties that stop x from having D. I don't know how to make
sense of this suggestion. Say you have some object x that is "barely fragile."
You change x's properties by adding some fortifying stuff to it, so that it
nonfragile. It is not as if, after it has become tough as nails, x has
the bare fragility lingering inside of it. If the fragility gets "swamped," then
is its causal
the disposition and the causal basis go away. If a disposition
and keep the
basis, you're never going to be able to lose the disposition
becomes

causal

basis.

3.3 Concluding

Remarks about The Non-Identity

Thesis

of bare dispositions. Perhaps
PPJ's arguments don't rule out the possibility
this is because PPJ's target is not a bare-dispositionalist,
but rather an iden
tity theorist like Armstrong who argues
distinct are in fact one and the same. While
appealing

to

non-dispositional,

categorical,

that two properties which appear
PPJ define 'causal basis' without
or

micro-structural

properties,

their arguments for the Non-Identity Thesis assume that we can distinguish
in
some way (descriptively or conceptually, perhaps) between a disposition and
its causal basis. However,
if we are considering a disposition which
is its
own causal basis, we can make no such distinction. A causal basis is simply
the object's causal contribution to the manifestation.
PPJ's arguments for the
that what it is about the
Non-Identity Thesis do not rule out the possibility
is just a bare disposi
object that causally contributes to the manifestation
tion.34

33

"Three Theses...,"
251.
One might think that this possibility
is ruled out by the third of the "Three Theses
about
to which
are not causally
The Impotence Thesis,
Dispositions,"
according
dispositions
the arguments for this third thesis rely on the first two. So, unless we
relevant. However,
have

independent
should

arguments

reasons

for

not convince

are causally
thinking that dispositions
us that there can be no bare dispositions.
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4. Bare
bear

claims

Disposition

has

something

a

some

Counterfactuals
to

relation

important
a certain

disposition,

counterfactuals.

counterfactual

true

is

When

of

that

thing.

sugar cube and a
Suppose that I have on my table a normal, water-soluble
room
at
The
of
temperature.
cup
prevailing circumstances
ordinary tap water,
laws

pressure,

(atmospheric

of

nature,

etc.)

are

as

one

would

expect.

Barring

skepticism, it is safe to say that if I put this sugar cube in this cup
of water, it would dissolve. In possible worlds talk, in the closest possible
world in which I put the sugar cube into the water, the sugar cube dissolves.
inductive

The observation
this way
reasons.

is supposed

are connected with
that dispositions
to cause trouble for bare dispositions

It is reasonable

to

suppose

that

true

in

counterfactuals
for the following
are

counterfactuals

true

because

of facts about the actual world. Given

the circumstances described above, the
true:
If
is
the
sugar cube were placed in water, it
following
would dissolve. But given that I haven't actually placed the sugar cube in the
water, the submersion of the cube and the dissolving of the cube are no part
counterfactual

the counterfactual true? A plausible answer
is that it is something about the sugar cube's properties. The sugar cube is
connected by weak ionic bonds which break
composed of glucose molecules,
when confronted with the bipolarity of H20 molecules,
and so on.
of the actual world. What makes

if the disposition
is bare? If solubility has no distinct causal
are
no
there
distinct
basis,
properties of the sugar cube which are causally
to
A
bare disposition
is like an inexplicable causal
relevant
its dissolving.
But what

It seems as if the only reason for saying that the object has the bare
involves non-actual circumstances and events. Is there anything
disposition
about the actual world that makes the counterfactual true? If not, bare disposi
tions would seem to run afoul of what C. B. Martin, Armstrong,
and others

power.

have called the 'Truth Maker Principle." Armstrong
says "It seems obvious
there must be something
that for every true contingent proposition
in the
the proposition
world (in the largest sense of 'something') which makes
true."35

However,

unless more

is said about what can and what

cannot count

as

this principle
(in the largest sense of 'something')
something
seems vacuous. The bare dispositionalist
can say that the fact that something
has a disposition
is something in the world. She can say that the counterfac
tual "if the sugar cube were placed in water, it would dissolve" is made true
Left at this intuitive and abstract
by the sugar cube's being water-soluble.
in the world

level, the argument from Truth Makers does not count against the bare dispo
sitions thesis. Michael
Smith and Daniel Stoljar offer an argument that
the
this
sharpens
point suggested by the Truth Maker Principle. However,

Belief,
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11. See also Dispositions:

A Debate,

15.

argument offers an opportunity

to sharpen her

for the bare dispositionalist

as well.

reply

4.1 Smith and Stoljar's Argument
and Stoljar begin by noting that some disposition claims are contin
an
gent;
object with a certain disposition might have lacked it. That is, there
is a possible world in which that object exists but lacks the disposition.

Smith

that:

Suppose

(1) x is disposed

to exhibit manifestation

They give the following

to exhibit M

(3) "x is disposed
M in C,
and from the supposition

in C"

is true iff in the closest

In the closest

in C" is true iff x is disposed

x-in-C world,

If (1) is true of the actual world,
it true. If someone

x-in-C

were

thing to say is that x is disposed

to exhibit

that (1) is true, they derive:
x exhibits M

in C.36

is a bare disposition,
Smith and Stoljar say that if x's disposition
not only contingent, but "barely true." That is to say:

makes

C.

schema:

the disquotation

(4)

in circumstances

semantic analysis of (1):

(2) "x is disposed to exhibit M
world, x exhibits M in C.
Given

M

say, then there
to ask

is no further

'What about
37
to verb in C.

facjt about

then (1) is

the actual

the actual world makes

(1)

world

true?',

that

the only

(4) is derived from (1) via the a priori premises (2) and (3). Smith and Stoljar
claim that this shows that if (1) is contingent and barely true, then (4) must
be contingent and barely true as well. But what, they ask, does
that (4) is barely true? Consider the worlds @, wb and w2.
@:

x is not in C, and x does not exhibit M.

w}:

x is in C, and x exhibits M.

itmean

to say

w2: x is in C, and x does not exhibit M.

36

"Global

37

Response

Dependence...,"

98.

Ibid.,9\.
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to (4), @ ismore

According

are

there

true,

no

similar to w? than it is to w2. But if (4) is barely

features

intrinsic

of @,

and w2

Wj,

that make

it the

case

that

this does, according to Smith
as an extrinsic rather than an intrinsic rela

similar to Wj than it is to w2. What

@ is more

and Stoljar, is to treat similarity
tion. There is no intrinsic property of @ in virtue of which it is more similar
were true, the relationship
to Wj than it is to w2. If bare dispositionalism
between @ and Wj would be one of "bare similarity." Smith
that there is any such external relation of bare similarity.
claim
We

"is

an

internal

relation

par

are not sure that any

ourselves

the Bare Dispositions
39
similarity.

of

excellence."3*

external

succeed

Theory

They

relation

between

in characterizing

go

on

and Stoljar deny
Similarity,

they

to say:

that the friends
possible worlds
should count as a relationship
of

can be bare,
The general point can be characterized as follows. If dispositions
then there can be counterfactuals that are barely true. If an object had a bare
a certain counterfactual statement would be true, but that state
disposition,
not be reducible to or explainable by any categorical facts. If you
are going to analyze counterfactuals in terms of similarity to other possible
worlds, then you are going to have to say that similarity between possible
worlds is not always determined by intrinsic, categorical properties of worlds,
and that seems like an odd thing to say.

ment would

4.2 The Bare Dispositionalist

Response

There are basically two ways to respond to Smith and Stoljar's argument.
is committed to the bare truth of
One is to deny that the bare dispositionalist
x
M in C." I gave an account of
exhibits
"In
the
closest
x-in-C
world,
(4),
is bare. A bare disposition
is a disposition
itmeans to say a disposition
no
no
route
from
there to under
basis.
There
is
obvious
with
distinct causal
what

standing what it means to say that a statement is barely true. As we have
seen, Smith and Stoljar elaborate on the claim that (1), "x is disposed to
exhibit M

in C," is barely true as follows:

If ( 1) is true of the actual world,
makes

it true. If someone

were

thing to say is that x is disposed

say, then there
to ask

is no further

'What about

fact

about

the actual world makes

the actual

world

(1) true?',

that

the only

to verb in C.

that that is the only thing to say. The question is ambigu
the disposition?"
"why should we expect x to manifest
There might be a number of ways to respond to such a question. Consider the
it true that this
"barely" soluble sugar cube. What about the world makes
It is not obvious

ous.

38
39
40

364

It could mean:

Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 99.
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to dissolve

sugar cube is disposed
the

one,

cube

sugar

is not

encased

if I put it in this cup of water? Well,
in

some

waterproof

For

coating.

for

another

is not frozen, but is at 72 degrees. On another reading, the
be
could
asking: "what brought it about that x has this disposition?"
question
There might be all manner of things to say about how and why the sugar
thing,

the water

cube acquired its bare disposition. Perhaps God endowed the sugar cube with
this bare disposition. Or, the question might mean: "in virtue of which under
if we are supposing
lying properties does x have the disposition?" However,
this question has a false presupposition.
that x has a bare disposition,
Since
we
it is not clear which of these questions is being asked when
say "What
about the actual world makes (1) true?", it is not clear that if something has a
bare disposition, any sentence saying so is a sentence which is barely true.
even if we grant that "x is disposed to exhibit M in C" is
Moreover,
barely true, it does not follow that (4) is barely true as well. Smith and Stol
jar's semantic analysis of the disposition claim is a conjunction of two sepa
rable analyses, a counterfactual analysis of dispositions, and a possible worlds
semantics for counterfactual statements. Smith and Stoljar's argument relies
That is,
upon the a priori truth of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions.
it relies on (2) '"x is disposed
in-C worlds, x exhibits M

to exhibit M

inC

x

is true iff in the closest

in C" being an a priori
truth.41 The bare
is not forced to accept this analysis. There are notorious

dispositionalist
problems for giving a satisfactory counterfactual analysis of dispositions.42 A
weaker, intuitively plausible claim is that if something has a disposition,
other things being equal, a certain counterfactual is true of that thing. But

statements are a priori equivalent to
that is not to say that disposition
counterfactuals. Smith and Stoljar need (2) to be a priori in order for (4) to
follow a priori from (1).
Finally, even if we grant that (4) follows a priori from (1), it is not obvi
ous that (l)'s being barely true entails that (4) is barely true as well. It is not
clear

that

bare

truth

transmits

over

a priori

entailment.

To

take

an

example

from Gareth Evans, if we give the name 'Neptune' to whatever causes the
in the orbit of Uranus, then "Neptune is Neptune" a priori
perturbations
entails "Neptune causes the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus."43 Plausi
it is not plausible that
"Neptune is Neptune" is barely true. However,
"Neptune causes the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus" is barely true, for
there are many facts about our solar system and the laws which govern it that

bly,

make

41

the

second

sentence

true.

Ibid., 98.
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4.3 Biting

have looked at ways inwhich the bare dispositionalist
could resist having
to say that (4) is barely true. Now let's look at how the bare dispositionalist
could respond if she accepts that (4) is barely true. She could admit that
barely true counterfactuals and extrinsic similarities among possible worlds
are consequences of allowing bare dispositions
into her ontology. More gen

We

be allowing for irreducible modal properties. By "modal
things like 'being possible',
'being necessary',
properties"
'being a
cause' and a host of interrelated properties, which includes 'having a disposi
tion', and 'having a counterfactual true of you'. To say there can be bare dis
positions is to say that a thing can have a modal property irrespective of its
she would

erally,

I mean

other properties. Broadening the picture, that would be to say that a modal
property of some world does not depend on any other features intrinsic to that
a modal property in a world must be based on
of
that world is to beg the question against the
properties
bare-dispositionalist.
Similarly for Smith and Stoljar's claim that:

world. To

insist that having

some non-modal

if one possible

world

to another, this must be explained by the intrinsic features of the
But to say that similarity must be explained
in terms of intrinsic
in terms of the non-dispositional
is to insist that it be explained...

is similar

in question....

possible

worlds

features

of possible
44

worlds

properties...

That is just another way of saying that the modal needs grounding in the non
modal?the
needs grounding in the non-dispositional.
If my
dispositional
a
can
can
be
"there
be
not
modal
that
is
put
property
hypothesis
grounded in
non-modal

properties," then this has been denied without argument.
One consideration that Smith and Stoljar raise is that barely true counter
factuals run afoul of the principle that similarity is an internal relation. I'll

grant for the sake of argument that modal properties are relational proper
ties?they depend on which possible worlds are nearby. However,
intuitively,
it is not at all clear why similarity must be similarity of intrinsic properties.
things can be similar in their relational properties. I'm similar to Ned in
that we are both within a mile of Boston, and that we are both shorter than
Alex. Do Smith and Stoljar mean to be denying such claims when they say
Two

that similarity is "an internal relation par excellence"! If people can be simi
lar with respect to their relational properties, then why not worlds? There
doesn't seem to be anything wrong in principle with talking about worlds
similar

being
For

example,

to one another with
some

worlds

similar to the actual world
With

this inmind,

can

be

respect to their relations
similar
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to other worlds.

in that

they

are more

than to some far off world.

described.

"Global

to one

96.

worlds

Smith

and Stoljar

@:

x is not in C, and x does not exhibit M.

w,:

x is in C, and x exhibits M.

w2: x is in C, and x does not exhibit M.
is to say why @ is more
The challenge posed to the bare dispositionalist
similar to w} than it is to w2. Granted, she can't say that they are similar
with respect to their intrinsic, categorical properties. But she can say that @
and Wj are similar in that they are both more similar to other x-Ming-in-C
worlds. Similarly
than they are to x-not-Ming-in-C
(or perhaps
can
in
statement
that
@
and
the
"If x
she
counterfactual
say
w1?
equivalently),
were in C, x would exhibit M" is true. She can say that @ and w, are similar
worlds

in that, in both worlds,

x has the disposition

to exhibit M

in C.

4.4 "Bare Truth" Revisited
Perhaps Smith and Stoljar's arguments suffer from a less than clear charac
terization of what it means to say that a statement is barely true. Michael
Dummett gives an alternative account of bare truth in terms of reducibility:
"A statement is barely true if it is true, but there is no class of statements not
containing it or a trivial variant of it to which any class containing it can be
reduced."45 So, if a statement is barely true, on this view, it can only be
"reduced" to itself, or a trivial varient. The suggestion
is that while ordinary
can
a
statements
state
be
such
bare
reduction,
given
disposition
disposition
ments cannot. Ordinary (non-bare) disposition
statements could be reduced to
statements about causal bases, or they could be translated into counterfactual
statements

and

blance?that

then

cashed

out

in terms

worlds.46 The
ments

about

modal

claims.

is,
reductionist
categorical

or

among
program of

non-modal

a

of

resemblance

less

problematic

categorical
translating
properties

properties
all statements

cannot

allow

resem

notion,

for

of

possible
into state

barely

true

Two questions arise with respect to this conception of bare truth as irre
statements irreducible in this sense?
ducibility. First, are bare disposition
answer
the
is
is
it is not clear
this a problem? Well,
Second,
yes.
Plausibly,
statements are irreducible, arguably, they are in
that it is. If bare disposition
good company. If we are to reduce all statements containing problematic
"What

is a Theory

of Meaning
Truth and Meaning
II", in Evans and McDowell,
(Oxford:
to the same thing as holding "that we
Press, 1976), 94. He says that it comes
answer to the question
'In virtue of what
is a statement ...true
expect a non-trivial

Clarendon
cannot

MA: MIT
(94). Robert Stalnaker points out in Inquiry
(Cambridge,
1987) that these do not come to the same thing; you might not be able to reduce a
answer
and yet there might be some non-trivial
to the question
'in virtue of
statement,

when

it is true?'"

Press,
what

is the statement

This

is how Stalnaker

true?'
characterizes

Lewis'
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view

(Inquiry,

155-160).
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such

notions

modal

facts

non-modal

do the job,
points out:

will

a reductionist

as

them

and

causes,

dispositions,

to reduce

we

to. Unless

can

we

laws,

specify

is at best a promissory

reductionism

that the causal dependencies
presupposes
powers
things in a possible world derive from relational
in terms of the way
the possible world
defined
world, properties
the project requires isolation of a level of pure categorical
worlds....
program
of
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